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Abstract
Recent works have demonstrated the existence of
adversarial examples targeting a single machine
learning system. In this paper we ask a simple
but fundamental question of “selective fooling”:
given multiple machine learning systems assigned
to solve the same classification problem and tak-
ing the same input signal, is it possible to con-
struct a perturbation to the input signal that ma-
nipulates the outputs of these multiple machine
learning systems simultaneously in arbitrary pre-
defined ways? For example, is it possible to selec-
tively fool a set of “enemy” machine learning sys-
tems but does not fool the other “friend” machine
learning systems? The answer to this question
depends on the extent to which these different ma-
chine learning systems “think alike”. We formu-
late the problem of “selective fooling” as a novel
optimization problem, and report on a series of ex-
periments on the MNIST dataset. Our preliminary
findings from these experiments show that it is
in fact very easy to selectively manipulate multi-
ple MNIST classifiers simultaneously, even when
the classifiers are identical in their architectures,
training algorithms and training datasets except
for random initialization during training. This
suggests that two nominally equivalent machine
learning systems do not in fact “think alike” at all,
and opens the possibility for many novel applica-
tions and deeper understandings of the working
principles of deep neural networks.
1. Introduction
Recent works (Bhambri et al., 2019; Brunner et al., 2018;
Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Kurakin et al., 2016; Goodfellow
et al., 2014; Szegedy et al., 2013) have shown that the out-
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puts of many machine learning systems can be significantly
changed using very small carefully-chosen perturbations to
the inputs. In many cases, it is possible to gain essentially
complete control over the outputs of such systems with input
perturbations that are imperceptible to human senses.
Such vulnerability to adversarial attacks poses a major
challenge to building robust and reliable machine learn-
ing systems, and, as a result, understanding and mitigating
this phenomenon has become a major focus of research.
While this research has produced many interesting findings
(Tramer et al., 2017; Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Fawzi et al.,
2018; Brunner et al., 2018; Yi et al., 2019; Bhambri et al.,
2019), theoretical explanations for, and practical defenses
against, adversarial attacks both remain open problems at
this time.
If we imagine machine learning systems to have perceptions,
adversarial attacks can be thought of as illusions. This gives
rise to the question: to what extent do different machine
learning systems “see” the same features? In particular, we
may ask whether two machine learning systems share the
same illusions. We seek to answer this question by studying
the extent to which it is possible to selectively manipulate
multiple machine learning systems in different ways. In
other words, we would like to know if it is possible to
design input perturbations that simultaneously manipulate
multiple machine learning systems into “seeing” different
things.
The study of such more powerful attacks may help us un-
derstand the nature of adversarial attacks better. In addition,
a study of such precise adversarial attacks may be of inter-
est in its own right. For instance, the ability to precisely
change the outputs of a set of selected machine learning
systems while leaving other systems unaffected may allow
the creation of adversarial attacks that fool “enemy” ma-
chine learning systems, but spare “friend” machine learning
systems. This can potentially be useful in various security
applications, for example, in evading detections by enemy
forces in battlefields.
To our knowledge, adversarial attacks that selectively and
differentially target multiple machine learning systems have
not been studied in detail in previous works. However, many
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of the underlying ideas have been used in other contexts.
Certainly, the idea of using multiple machine learning sys-
tems to augment each other in various ways in adversarial
settings is not new. Many proposed defenses against adver-
sarial attacks use auxiliary neural networks in various ways
(Yin et al., 2019; Yi et al., 2019; Song et al., 2018; Saman-
gouei et al., 2018), e.g., binary classifiers that are trained to
detect adversarial inputs, or generative networks for retrain-
ing networks to reduce their vulnerability to such inputs. A
common way to train adversarial generative networks is by
using a discriminator network adversarially.
There also exists a significant volume of literature on trans-
ferability of adversarial attacks (Zheng et al., 2019; Lin
et al., 2019; Kang et al., 2019; Adam et al., 2019; Fawzi
et al., 2018; Tramer et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2016), i.e., the
question of whether an attack designed for one machine
learning system is effective against another system. Our for-
mulation in this paper is related to transferability but is very
different and significantly more general. Specifically, we
consider adversarial perturbations that are simultaneously
designed to attack multiple machine learning systems, and
also to have potentially different effects on each attacked
system. Before our investigation, even the existence of such
highly precise and selective attacks is not clear. Our main
objective in this paper is to investigate this selective attack,
and perform an experimental study to provide preliminary
answers to this and other related questions.
1.1. Summary of Objectives and Findings
Our overall objective is to construct adversarial attacks
which selectively and precisely manipulate multiple ma-
chine learning systems. In particular, we seek general an-
swers to the following fundamental questions.
1. How selective and precise can adversarial attacks be?
Specifically, what is the largest number of different
machine learning systems that can be simultaneously
and selectively manipulated by the same adversarial
input?
2. A trivial mathematical observation is that selective
adversarial attacks targeting multiple machine learn-
ing systems simultaneously must require strictly larger
perturbations than attacks targeting just one system.
However, it is not clear how strong this relationship
is. Thus, we would like to quantify the trade-off be-
tween how precise and selective an attack is, and how
imperceptible it is to human and other senses.
3. We would like to understand the transferability of se-
lective adversarial perturbations i.e. how selective ad-
versarial perturbations designed to target a number
of machine learning algorithms affect other machine
learning systems that the attack was not designed for.
4. Finally, we would like to use selective adversarial at-
tacks as a tool to gain insights into the internal work-
ings of otherwise-opaque machine learning algorithms.
While our problem formulation is quite general, our experi-
ments were focused on a set of K = 5 deep neural network
classifiers for the MNIST dataset1. These 5 classifiers are
identical in their architectures, training procedures and data
sets, differing only in their random initial weights. Each
of the 5 classifiers also had approximately equal (and very
high) accuracy for their test data sets. Our preliminary find-
ings from these experiments are summarized as follows.
1. The answer to whether we can construct adversarial
attacks selectively targeting multiple machine learning
systems simultaneously is a definite ’YES’. We pro-
pose novel optimization formulation to design adversar-
ial attacks which selectively attack multiple machine
learning systems. We have been able to successfully
generate adversarial perturbations against 5 MNIST
classifiers to several sets of pre-specified target labels.
For example, we can design attacks which selectively
fool a set of “enemy” machine learning systems, but do
not fool the other “friend” machine learning systems.
2. Mathematically we can show that the size of the opti-
mal perturbations increases with the number of classi-
fiers being targeted, a conclusion that seems intuitively
reasonable. However, our algorithm for generating
these perturbations in some cases actually yields small
perturbations when attacking more systems. We offer
some possible explanations for this counter-intuitive
result.
3. Adversarial examples that are designed to attack multi-
ple classifiers have significantly greater transferability
to other classifiers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents a brief survey of related works. Selective adversar-
ial attacks are formally defined as an optimization problem
in Section 3. Our experiments on selective adversarial at-
tacks on 5 MNIST classifiers are described in Section 4 .
Section 5 concludes this paper.
Notations: We use [N ] to denote the set {1, 2, · · · , N}.
2. Background and Related Work
As noted earlier, the phenomenon of adversarial vulnera-
bility has now become an important focus of research in
machine learning since the work by Szegedy et al. (Szegedy
et al., 2013) and there is now a vast and growing litera-
ture on this subject. The adversarial vulnerability has been
1http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
observed in various tasks (Wang et al., 2020; Zhou et al.,
2019; Bhambri et al., 2019; Zhao et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019;
Khormali et al., 2019; Carlini & Wagner, 2018; Grosse et al.,
2016) and for different machine learning systems especially
deep neural networks (Zgner & Gnnemann, 2019; Ko et al.,
2019).
Adversarial attacks are a broad phenomenon that can be
classified in several possible ways. One important distinc-
tion is between white-box attacks where the attacker has
access to the internals of the machine learning systems be-
ing targeted (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Carlini & Wagner, 2017;
Madry et al., 2017; Bose et al., 2019) and corresponding
defenses, (Meng et al., 2020; Zhang & Liang, 2019; Yi et al.,
2019; ?; Samangouei et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2018; Madry
et al., 2017; Ilyas et al., 2017), and black box attacks (Yan
et al., 2019; Meunier et al., 2019; Brunner et al., 2018; Pa-
pernot et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2016) and their defenses (?Xie
et al., 2018; Ilyas et al., 2017).
The fast gradient sign method (FGSM) (Szegedy et al., 2013;
Goodfellow et al., 2014; Kurakin et al., 2016; Yi et al., 2019),
the DeepFool method (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016), and
the Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017)
are three of the most popular algorithms for generating
white-box attacks.
In adversarial attacks based on FGSM (Szegedy et al., 2013;
Goodfellow et al., 2014), an adversarial sample is generated
via
xadv = trunc (x+  · sign(∇x`(x, u))) , (1)
where x ∈ RM is a benign sample,  > 0 is a small posi-
tive constant, sign(·) is an element-wise sign function, and
∇x`(x, u) is the gradient of loss function ` with respect to
the input x. The u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , L} is the true label of x,
and the trunc(·) function is applied to guarantee that the
adversarial sample is within a normal range, i.e., the pixels
of an image should be within [0, 255].
It has been observed that adversarial samples designed for
one machine learning system can also fool other machine
learning systems (Liu et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2017;
Tramer et al., 2017; Dong et al., 2019). This transferabil-
ity of adversarial samples allows us to design adversarial
samples for a substitute system, and then use these samples
to fool the target system. In sampling-based black-box at-
tacking method, we initialize an adversarial sample which
can be quite different from the benign sample, and then we
gradually shrink the distance from the adversarial sample to
the benign sample by randomly sampling a moving direc-
tion (Brunner et al., 2018; Narodytska & Kasiviswanathan,
2016). Different from the white-box attacks where the gra-
dient can be easily calculated, the gradient-free black-box
attack uses an estimate of the gradient to perform the search-
ing of adversarial samples (Chen et al., 2017; Ilyas et al.,
2018; Tu et al., 2019).
As one of the most important black-box attacking meth-
ods, the transferability of adversarial samples has received
tremendous amount of attention recently (?Zheng et al.,
2019; Lin et al., 2019; Kang et al., 2019; Adam et al., 2019;
Fawzi et al., 2018; Tramer et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2016).
In (Liu et al., 2016), Liu et al. reported that though an ad-
versarial sample generated for one system can fool another
system, it cannot always fool the two systems into making
the same wrong decision, e.g., being classified as in the
same wrong class. This means that the adversarial samples
can transfer, but their labels cannot always. The authors
further proposed an ensemble-based approach to increase
the transferability of targeted adversarial attacks to a sin-
gle to-be-attacked black-box machine learning system. This
topic was further studied by Adam et al. (Adam et al., 2019).
In (Adam et al., 2019), the authors proposed to optimize the
distance of the gradients of different models in training so
that the transferability of adversarial attacks can be reduced.
Another viewpoint of the adversarial transferability was pro-
posed by Lin et al. (Lin et al., 2019), and they argued that
the transferability of an adversarial sample is just like the
generalization performance of a training learning system.
Based on this, they proposed to improving the transferabil-
ity via techniques similar to those used for improving the
generalization performance of learning systems.
On the theoretical side, Tramer et al. made attempts to
investigate the fundamental reasons accounting for the tran-
ferability of adversarial samples (Tramer et al., 2017). They
showed that for two different models, their decisions regions
are highly overlapped, and also gave conditions on the data
distribution for guaranteeing the transferability. Another
line of theoretical work by Fawzi et al. (Fawzi et al., 2018)
gave an upper bound on the probability for an adversar-
ial sample to be transferable when the decision regions of
learning systems are highly overlapped.
This paper focuses on white-box evasion attacks on classifier
networks where the attacks can be optimally designed using
iterative algorithms. These are, of course, the most favorable
conditions for the attacker and allows for the design of the
strongest and most powerful class of attacks.
3. Problem Statement: Optimal Selective
Adversarial Attacks
We now formally define selective adversarial attacks as a
constrained optimization problem.
Consider a setM .= {M1, M2, . . . , MN} of N trained
machine learning classifiers. The i-th (i = 1 . . . N ) machine
learning system Mi maps an input vector x ∈ RM to one
label u: fi(x) = u ∈ {1 . . . L}, where L is the number of
Figure 1. Conceptual framework of selective adversarial attack.
Figure 2. Conceptual framework of classification with multiple
classifiers.
labels, and {1 . . . L} is the set of labels. Let f0() : RM →
{1 . . . L} denote the ground-truth mapping, namely u0 =
f0(x) is the “true label” of a given input x.
Machine learning classifiers typically work with high-
dimensional inputs i.e. M  1. We assume that each
of the classifiersMi are highly accurate i.e.:
Pr (fi(x) = f0(x)) ≈ 1, ∀i = 1 . . . N (2)
over a relevant test distribution p(x) of the inputs x. Let
f(·) denote the vector function mapping an input x ∈ RM
to a vector of N labels u = [u1 u2 . . . uN ] ∈ {1 . . . L}N
i.e. u = f(x) .= [f1(x) f2(x) . . . fN (x)]. See Figure 1
and 2.
Consider some arbitrary input vector x0 ∈ RM , the cor-
responding true label u0
.
= f0(x0), and an arbitrary set
of N “target labels” ut ∈ {1 . . . L}N . Note that if x0 is
chosen from the test distribution p(x), then with high prob-
ability, all the N classifiers produce the correct label to the
unperturbed input vector x0 i.e.
Pr
(
f(x0) = [u0 u0 . . . u0]
) ≈ 1 (3)
We now formally define an optimal selective adversarial
attack as the smallest perturbation applied to the input vector
x0 that causes the N classifiersMi, i = 1 . . . N to output
the target labels ut, each of which may be different from
(or remains the same as) the true label u0, and may be
different from each other. Specifically the optimal selective
perturbation d(x0, ut) : RM × {1 . . . L}N → RM for an
input vector x0 and the intended label set ut is defined as:
d(x0, ut)
.
= arg min
δ∈RM
‖δ‖,
subject to f (x0 + δ) ≡ ut (4)
Remark. Note that in the definition (4), there is an implicit
assumption that the constraint is feasible i.e. that there
exists x ∈ RN such that f(x) ≡ ut for any target label
set ut. This, of course, is an assumption about the range
of the functions f() describing the classifiers. Indeed it is
a very strong assumption about how differently multiple
nominally equivalent classifiers process their inputs. One
of our objectives in this paper is to empirically test this
assumption. Our findings in this paper surprisingly show
that the constraint is often feasible under an arbitrary set of
labels.
3.1. Selective Fooling
We now consider an interesting sub-class of selective adver-
sarial attacks which we will call Selective Fooling. In this
class of attacks, we choose a single adversarial target label
ua that is different from the true label u0 and design a per-
turbation that will cause a subset of n < N classifiers inM
to output the label ua while the remaining N − n classifiers
inM continue to output the true label u0. In other words,
we seek to selectively fool a subset of classifiers to output a
particular target label ua while leaving the remaining ones
unaffected.
Formally, Selective Fooling is a selective adversarial attack
where the target label vector is set to be:
ut[i] =
{
ua, i ∈ {1 . . . n},
u0 i ∈ {n+ 1 . . . N}
(5)
for some ua ∈ {1 . . . L} \ {u0}.
3.2. Selective Adversarial Attacks using Gradient
Descent
We now discuss a simple method that extends previously
known algorithms such as FGSM (Szegedy et al., 2013) that
have been shown to be effective in generating adversarial
examples to create selective adversarial perturbations. The
basic idea is to formulate a cost function that serves as a
proxy for the optimization problem in (4), and then use a
gradient descent procedure to approximate a solution to (4).
Let pi(x), i = 1 . . . N, x ∈ RM represent the probability
distribution output by the classifierMi for the input vector x
over theL possible labels 1 . . . L. Mathematically pi(x) is a
1× L vector that satisfies∑Lu=1 pi,u(x) ≡ 1, ∀i, x, where
pi,u(x) is the u-th element of pi(x). In practice, pi are
typically calculated using a “softmax” function (Goodfellow
et al., 2016) in the last layer of a deep neural network. Let
δu, u ∈ {1 . . . L}, be the 1× L Kronecker delta vector i.e.:
δu[l]
.
=
{
1, l = u,
0, otherwise
(6)
Layer name Layer type
Input layer input(28,28,1)
Layer 1 conv2d(32,3,3) + ReLU
Layer 2 conv2d(32,3,3) + ReLU + maxpool(2,2)
Layer 3 conv2d(64,3,3) + ReLU
Layer 4 conv2d(64,3,3) + ReLU + maxpool(2,2)
Layer 5 FC(200) + ReLU
Layer 6 FC(200) + ReLU
Layer 7 FC(10) + Softmax
Table 1. Architecture of neural networks in experiments. The FC
is the fully connected layer, and the stride is 1 for convolution and
maxpooling.
Given a target label set u = [u1 u2 . . . uN ], we define the
following cost function J(x), x ∈ RM :
J(x) =
N∑
i=1
‖pi(x)− δui‖2 (7)
Our selective adversarial attack algorithm will iteratively
reduce this proxy cost function by gradient descent. Of
course a method for generating adversarial examples via
gradient searches on the heuristic cost function in (7) can
only approximate the optimal solution to (4). Indeed, we
will see in our experimental results, that adversarial pertur-
bations obtained from this cost function differs from the
optimal solution in some interesting and counter-intuitive
ways. We also remark that we can replace the cost function
in (7) with other cost functions, such as cost functions using
cross-entropy.
4. Experimental Results
We constructed a total of N = 5 Convolutional Neural
Networks with the architecture shown in Table 1. We trained
each of them on the MNIST handwritten digit recognition
dataset2. AllN networks were identical except for a random
initialization of their weights.
4.1. Training the Classifiers
We used a Stochastic Gradient Descent to minimize the soft-
max cross entropy function with a learning rate of 0.01, a
decay of 1e − 6, and a momentum of 0.9 to train each of
the 5 networks. The models were trained using the MNIST
training data, obtained from the Keras MNIST dataset, for
10 epochs with 55, 000 images per epoch. The trained net-
works were evaluated on 10, 000 MNIST images from a sep-
arate test set. This resulted in all of the 5 networks achieving
an accuracy of at least 95% accuracy on the test set. The
models were trained using different random initializations
2http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
of the network weight and bias parameters.
Next we describe the procedure we used to generate selec-
tive adversarial examples and a series of experiments that
we performed using these trained networks.
4.2. Constructing Selective Adversarial Attacks
In all of our experiments, we used images with the true class
label of ‘0’ (results for other digits are similar, and so we
focus on label ‘0’ for our presentation ) from the aforemen-
tioned MNIST handwritten digit recognition dataset, and
then constructed selective adversarial attacks designed to
manipulate each of the 5 networks in arbitrary pre-specified
ways. We used modified versions of two popular algo-
rithms to generate our adversarial examples: (a) the modi-
fied Carlini-Wagner (mCW) algorithm (Carlini & Wagner,
2017) and (b) the modified Fast Gradient Signed Method
(mFGSM) (Szegedy et al., 2013; Kurakin et al., 2016).
The original Carlini-Wagner algorithm3 was designed to
construct adversarial examples for a single classifier using
a gradient descent procedure. We modified this algorithm
to perform gradient descent on the loss function J(x) as
defined in (7). The following parameter values were used in
our modified CW algorithm: confidence value 0.1, learning
rate 0.02, the number of binary search steps 9, and the
max number of iterations 10, 000. Our modified FGSM
algorithm4 also used the loss function very similar to (7)
(with the cross-entropy function replacing the l2 norm in
(7)). In our experiments with the modified FGSM algorithm,
we set the parameter  = 0.075 with the maximum number
of iterations fixed at 30.
4.3. Selective Fooling Experiment with Two Classifiers
Our first set of experiments involved the simple sub-class
of selective adversarial attacks defined in Section 3.1 with
N = 2, n = 1 i.e. we attempt to construct adversarial
examples that successfully fool one of two classifiers while
leaving the other classifier unaffected.
A total of 25 images of the label 0 were perturbed using
both the mCW and mFGSM algorithms described earlier
with random target labels. The mFGSM algorithm was able
to successfully construct Selective Fooling attacks on all
of the 25 images. The mCW algorithm was also able to
generate adversarial examples for a majority of images, but
takes longer to converge than mFGSM.
This shows the existence of selective adversarial examples,
at least for this simple special case of Selective Fooling
attack, and suggests that it may indeed be feasible to con-
struct adversarial examples that affect multiple classifiers
3https://github.com/carlini/nn robust attacks
4https://github.com/soumyac1999/FGSM-Keras
Figure 3. Average size of the adversarial perturbations generated
by the mCW algorithm as a function of the number of attacked
classifiers.
Figure 4. Average size of the mFGSM attack as a function of the
number of attacked classifiers.
in different ways (and surprisingly often in all the possible
ways) and motivates a deeper study of selective adversarial
attacks.
We also tested the effect of the adversarial examples gener-
ated by the mCW algorithm on a third classifier that was not
involved in the construction of the attack; the confidence
value of this third classifier in the true label (0) averaged over
the 25 images was calculated to be 0.778. Roughly speak-
ing, this shows that on average, a third classifier is approxi-
mately 75% unaffected by the Selective Fooling attack. In
contrast, the corresponding number for a non-selective fool-
ing attack against just one classifier using the unmodified
Carlini-Wagner algorithm was 0.843 i.e. a third classifier
was approximately 85% unaffected by such a non-selective
fooling attack. This seems somewhat counter-intuitive: we
may expect that a selective attack that narrowly targets one
classifier while leaving another classifier unaffected will be
less likely to affect a third classifier. Below we consider
a possible explanation for this and certain other similarly
counter-intuitive results.
4.4. Selective Fooling Experiment with Four Classifiers
In our next set of experiments, we constructed a series of
Selective Fooling attacks with N = 4 classifiers. Specifi-
cally, for a set of 25 images with the true label of u0 = 0
Figure 5. Confidence value in the true label for a fifth classifier as
a function of the number of attacked classifiers.
Figure 6. Magnitude of the FGSM attack as the number of attacked
models increases and the number of defended model decreases
when observing the general M and n attacks for four total models.
and for each of the 15 non-empty subsets of the 4 classifiers,
we attempted to construct selective adversarial attacks to
drive their outputs to a target label of ua = 9 using both
the mCW and mFGSM algorithms. Surprisingly, both the
mCW and mFGSM methods were able to successfully con-
struct adversarial examples that successfully fooled each of
the 24 − 1 = 15 non-empty subsets of the N = 4 classi-
fiers while keeping the complementary subset of classifiers
unfooled, for each of the 25 images.
The average size of the perturbations measured as the sum
of the absolute value of pixel differences between the input
image and the adversarial image, is shown as a function of
the number of targeted classifiers n in Figs. 3 and 4 for the
mCW and mFGSM algorithms respectively.
Discussion. The mere fact that there exists small perturba-
tions which selectively and precisely attack every possible
subset of classifiers is quite surprising. This suggests that
these classifiers might look at very different features for
classifications, and do not “think” alike, even though they
share the same architectures and training data. Figures 3 and
4 suggest that on average we need smaller perturbations to
attack more classifiers. We might expect that it would take
larger perturbations to simultaneously change the outputs
of two classifiers compared to one classifier. One possible
explanation for this observation - as well as our earlier obser-
a) One Attacked, Three Defended
b) Two Attacked, Two Defended
c) Three Attacked, One Defended
d) Four Attacked, None Defended
Figure 7. Examples of input images, their adversarial counterpart,
and the perturbations added for cases where a) n=1, b) n=2, c)
n=3, and d) n=4 classifiers are attacked via the mCW algorithm
out of N = 4 total.
vation about transferability of the Selective Fooling attack
- is that the attacks generated by the mCW and mFGSM
algorithms are not close to being optimal; a search con-
strained to leave one or more classifiers unaffected leads to
smaller perturbation perhaps because it is forced to keep
more features of the original image intact as compared to
an unconstrained search.
The confidence in the true label from a fifth classifier that
was not involved in the generation of the adversarial exam-
ples is shown as a function of the size of the target set n
in Figure 5 for the mCW generated attacks. This plot is
consistent with our intuitive expectation that an adversarial
example that successfully attacks many classifiers simul-
taneously is also more statistically likely to transfer to a
random classifier.
Adversarial example images for different values of n are
shown in Figure 7. Typical examples of adversarial images
with varying N and n and their respective magnitudes can
be seen in Fig. 8.
4.5. Attacking and Defending Subsets of Four
Classifiers with Different Target Labels
Our final set of experiments involved a generalization of
the Selected Fooling attack where a subset n of N = 4
classifiers were targeted to be attacked to n different target
labels chosen at random, while keeping the outputs of the
remaining N − n classifiers unchanged. Once again, the
mFSGM algorithm was able to successfully generate adver-
sarial examples for all 15 non-empty subsets of the N = 4
classifiers. The average size of the resulting perturbations
as a function of n is shown in Fig. 6.
5. Conclusions
We formulated the problem of selective adversarial attacks,
and presented an experimental investigation of a generalized
class of adversarial attacks that are designed to manipulate
the outputs of multiple machine learning classifiers simul-
taneously in arbitrarily pre-defined ways. We formulated
a novel optimization problem to search for such selective
attacks, and applied modified versions of popular algorithms
used for the construction of white-box adversarial examples
to design targeted attacks on 5 different trained classifiers
for the MNIST dataset. Our results show that it is indeed
possible to construct precisely targeted adversarial attacks
that can arbitrarily modify the outputs of multiple classifiers
while keeping another set of classifiers unaffected. These
results motivate a deeper study of such selective adversar-
ial attacks and also suggest that different classifiers that
have nominally similar performance may in fact have very
different decision regions.
1-0 :29.45 1-1 : 33.53 1-3 : 37.96 2-2 : 41.15 3-1 : 33.65 4-0 : 31.02
Figure 8. For an adversarial image attacking m = N − n classifiers and defending n classifiers, designated as m− n, we can see the
magnitudes of the attacks for the unmodified Carlini-Wagner attack (1-0), the simplest attack and defend case (1-1), and the four subset
cases (where the target labels are all set to 9).
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